The Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby decision opened up new avenues for anti-LGBTQ discrimination. |
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It finally happened.
On Thursday, U.S. District Judge Sean F. Cox found that Hobby Lobby’s broad guarantee
of “religious freedom” to businesses exempts religious employers from
the federal ban on workplace sex discrimination. Cox ruled that, under
the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, for-profit corporations
may claim a legal right to fire employees for being transgender. His
decision marks the first time a court has used Hobby Lobby’s
holding to abridge LGBTQ employees’ rights under nondiscrimination
law—an extension of “religious liberty” that anti-LGBTQ advocates insisted would never occur.
Mark Joseph Stern is a writer for Slate. He covers the law and LGBTQ issues. |
The case arose when R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes’ funeral
director, Amiee Stephens, announced plans to transition from male to
female. Thomas Rost, her employer, promptly fired her, explaining that
he could not tolerate her “dress[ing] as a woman” at work. On Stephens’
behalf, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued the funeral
home under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bars
discrimination on the basis of sex, including gender nonconformity. While courts have divided on whether anti-trans discrimination is always “sex discrimination,” it is widely accepted
that Title VII forbids employers from firing workers for failing to
conform to certain sex stereotypes. Moreover, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 6th Circuit has explicitly held that sex discrimination encompasses anti-trans discrimination—a ruling that is binding precedent here.
Rost acknowledged that he fired Stephens for transitioning. Although
his business is not religiously affiliated, Rost is a Christian. He
believes “that the Bible teaches that God creates people male or
female,” that “the Bible teaches that a person’s sex is an immutable
God-given gift,” and that “people should not deny or attempt to change
their sex.” As Rost explained in court filings, he believes that “the
Bible teaches that it is wrong for a biological male to deny his sex by
dressing as a woman”—and that he would thus “be violating God’s
commands” by continuing to employ Stephens.
With these facts and precedents, Rost should clearly lose this
lawsuit. But in court he argued that he was protected by RFRA, which
bars the government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of
religion, unless the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest
and is the least restrictive means necessary. Congress passed RFRA to protect religious minorities, but in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court’s conservatives stretched it to protect for-profit corporations, as well. Rost insists that, under Hobby Lobby,
employing a trans woman is a substantial burden on his religious
exercise in violation of RFRA and that Stephens’ lawsuit thus violates
his religious liberty.
Cox agreed. Rost, he wrote, has shown that enforcing Title VII “would
impose a substantial burden on the ability of the Funeral Home to
conduct business in accordance with its sincerely-held religious
beliefs.” Moreover, Cox found that the EEOC’s solution, an employment
discrimination lawsuit, is not the “least restrictive means” of
furthering nondiscrimination in the workplace. Instead, Cox wrote that
the EEOC and Rost should have attempted to work out a compromise—for
instance, forcing Stephens to wear gender-neutral clothing at work to
mask her transition.
Bizarrely, Cox also mused about whether the EEOC truly has a
compelling interest in preventing workplace discrimination against
trans employees, implying that it might not. And, in one sneering
passage, he seemed to mock Stephens for wishing to dress like a woman:
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The EEOC takes the position that Stephens must be allowed to wear a skirt-suit in order to express Stephens’s female gender identity. That is, the EEOC wants Stephens to be able to dress in a stereotypical feminine manner. If the compelling governmental interest is truly in removing or eliminating gender stereotypes in the workplace in terms of clothing (i.e., making gender “irrelevant”), the EEOC’s manner of enforcement in this action (insisting that Stephens be permitted to dress in a stereotypical feminine manner at work) does not accomplish that goal.
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This strange aside points to a broader problem with Cox’s opinion: It
is outwardly transphobic. Cox, a George W. Bush appointee,
fundamentally misunderstands the concept of gender transition, declines
to identify Stephens by her new name, and refuses to refer to her as a
woman. Yet this prejudiced undercurrent is not actually the decision’s
fatal flaw. The bigger problem is its application of the “least
restrictive means” analysis to RFRA. Courts are not allowed
to make up a less restrictive alternative in RFRA cases and scold the
government for not complying with its fantasy solution. That’s doubly
true in an employment discrimination case, where the universally
accepted solution to unlawful termination is a Title VII suit.
Cox’s decision, then, will almost certainly be overturned. But it is still a useful reminder of Hobby Lobby’s power in the hands of anti-LGBTQ judges. There’s a reason states rushed to pass mini-RFRAs in Hobby Lobby’s
wake: A right-leaning judiciary can always cite “religious liberty” to
abridge others’ rights, and LGBTQ people are usually first on the
chopping block. For years, conservative activists have sworn
that the new campaign for religious freedom is not a Trojan horse
designed to legalize anti-LGBTQ discrimination. Judge Cox just proved
them wrong.
Read more of Mark Joseph Sterns articles - here
Read more of Mark Joseph Sterns articles - here
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